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Abstract
We build a model of ﬁrms’ choice between formality and informal-
ity. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the ﬁrms
to beneﬁt from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and
contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market
possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their
decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into
formality, and the relative eﬃciency of formal versus informal credit
mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model
is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of infor-
mality.
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11 Introduction
Informality is a pervasive phenomenon around the world, and indeed one
that represents a major challenge to economic and social policies in develop-
ing countries. Although some progress has been made toward the empirical
measurement of informal activities, the theoretical understanding of their
causes and consequences is still lagging (see Schneider and Enste, 2000, for
a comprehensive survey).1
Being formal entails costs. For established economic units, these include
taxes, compliance with the whole array of regulations (related among others
to labor and environment), and possibly exposure to bribe taking by gov-
ernment oﬃcials. Moreover, as ﬁrst shown by de Soto (1987) in the case of
Peru, and further documented by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (2002) for 85 countries, ﬁrms support signiﬁcant “entry costs”, in the
form of registration and license fees, to be able to operate formally. These
are both direct monetary costs and the opportunity cost of the time spent
complying with legal requirements. According to Djankov et al. (2002), they
range from a low of 2 procedures, taking two days and generating a cost
equivalent to 2.3% of per capita GDP in Canada, to a high of 21 procedures,
80 days and 463% of per capita GDP in the Dominican Republic. Moreover,
in 30 out of the 85 countries they consider, the estimated cost exceeds 50%
of per capita GDP.
On the other hand, the beneﬁts of being formal consist in the access to
public goods and services, which we classify in two categories. First, those
making production possible (as, for example, police and judicial protection
against crime) and/or enhancing productivity (public infrastructure). Sec-
ond, the public goods which, by ensuring the enforcement of property rights
and contracts, secure access to speciﬁc markets, where they make interactions
between private agents possible and more eﬃcient.
Depending on the nature of the public goods, informal agents may be in-
completely excluded from their use, so they have an incentive to free ride, i.e.
use them at least partly while not participating in their ﬁnancing. Moreover,
there exist informal substitutes for these public goods and the speciﬁcm a r -
kets they give access to. These are either produced by the agents themselves
(reputation is a prominent example in the case of contracting), or by speciﬁc
1A common deﬁnition, focusing on legal activities, considers the informal economy to
be made of “all economic activities that contribute to the oﬃcially calculated (or observed)
gross national product but are currently unregistered” (Schneider and Enste, 2000).
2institutions (Maﬁa protection, neighbor associations for the establishment of
informal property rights on land, informal credit by money lenders, etc.).
Most of the literature adopts a simple formalization of the beneﬁts, as-
suming that formality gives access to a productivity enhancing public good,
while informal agents must invest in an imperfect substitute2. While this ﬁts
well the infrastructure interpretation of public goods, it is less satisfactory
when talking about property rights and contract enforceability, the primary
eﬀect of which is to allow entrepreneurs to participate in eﬃcient markets.
Moreover, there appears to be an interaction between the cost of formal-
ity and the relative eﬃciency of speciﬁc formal markets vs. their informal
counterparts that is crucial in explaining the formality decision.
The eﬀect of the second category of public goods is of particular impor-
tance in the credit market. Financial markets are at the heart of produc-
tive activities, both by sustaining medium and long term investment and by
smoothing exchanges through short term credit. As shown for example in
Pagano (2001), their eﬃciency depends crucially on a number of supporting
institutions, which allow lenders to secure a reasonable rate of repayment
by ensuring a steady ﬂow of information from borrowers to lenders, reduc-
ing strategic default, and facilitating judicial recovery of loans or guarantees.
In turn, these institutions function through the imposition of certain proce-
dures, which among others require borrowers to present credible documen-
tation relative to their physical location and pledgeable assets, and to make
their operations at least partly observable through speciﬁc records (books,
ﬁnancial statements, banking operations, information from their suppliers
and clients).
These requirements de facto exclude most informal producers, who lack
the incentive to incur these additional costs. Most of them do not register
their operations in books, they do not use banking accounts or traceable
means of payment, and they generally mix cash operations corresponding
to their business with their personal activity. For these reasons, monitoring
their business is diﬃcult, and most loans are made possible only because of
the strong enforcement techniques used by informal lenders, such as physical
threat, violent seizure of assets, etc. As an example, Straub and Sosa (2001)
report the following story, told by the president of the Paraguayan association
2See for example Loayza (1995), Marcouiller and Young (1995), Johnson, Kaufmann
and Shleifer (1997), Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (2000), Choi and
Thum (2002) and Azuma and Grossman (2002).
3of ﬁnance companies: “One of our clients was heavily indebted with several
creditors, including us and a usurer. As a way to remind him of his obligation,
the usurer sent him a bullet in an envelope. The client paid the usurer ﬁrst
and then ﬁled a reorganization procedure. We recovered only a small fraction
of the formal loans”.
We analyze the formality decision in a continuous investment model with
moral hazard àl aHolmstrom and Tirole (1997). The model builds on a dual
credit market structure, in which the basic assumption is that ex post income
is veriﬁable for formal lenders but not for informal ones, so these rely instead
on coercion to get repaid. By introducing a cost of entry into formality, it
then gives simple predictions linking the decision of each entrepreneur to
become formal or not to the amount of available initial capital, the relative
eﬃciency of credit markets and the cost of registering formally. Moreover, it
is extended to see how the trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the possibility to attach
collateral, a more or less eﬃcient judicial recovery of loans, the volatility of
the economic environment and the existence of labor rigidities like minimum
wage requirements or dismissal costs3.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it opens the black box
of formality versus informality beneﬁts by modeling explicitly the underlying
credit mechanisms in each sector, as well as the related institutional arrange-
ments. Second, it oﬀers an explanation of the formality choice that does
not rely on a ﬁxed employment or asset threshold, linked to some exogenous
institutional feature. Instead, taking entrepreneurs’ initial endowment as
given, the model exhibits a decision rule with an endogenous asset threshold
above which formalization is beneﬁcial. Finally, the eﬀect of diﬀerent types
of environmental characteristics on this threshold is analyzed.
In the next Section 2, we motivate the model by presenting an overview of
the existing empirical evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal
sector. Section 3 develops the model, Section 4 introduces a production
function in this basic setting to study the impact of labor market rigidities
and the possibility of diﬀerent levels of formality, and Section 5 concludes.
3Note, ﬁnally, that the choice between formality and informality is not an “all or
nothing” alternative, as stressed for example by Levenson and Maloney (1998). Rather,
there exist diﬀerent degrees of formality, given by the set of institutions and rules that
each ﬁrm decides to follow. Straub (2003) presents an extension of the model along this
line.
42 Empirical Motivation: Stylized Facts
Recent cross-country evidence emphasizes the negative correlation between
informality and diﬀerent aspects of the quality of institutions like corrup-
tion, rule of law and regulatory burden4. Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan
and Woodruﬀ (2000) present similar results at the ﬁrm-level for ﬁve Eastern
European countries. The general picture is one in which countries with lower
quality institutions or heavier burden of regulation also have a larger informal
sector. There is less clear-cut evidence, however, regarding the direction of
causality and the mechanisms linking institutional outcomes and the extent
of informality. Although Friedman et al. (2000) present instrumental regres-
sions using the set of instruments suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1999), which includes ethnolinguistic fragmen-
tation, origin of the legal system, religious composition and latitude, some
recent works suggest that at least part of these instruments may be associ-
ated with informality through other channels than the quality of institutions.
This is the case for legal origin, which Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) show to be associated with the level of labor
regulation, itself correlated with the extent of informality; it is also true of
the degree of ethnic divisions, which Lassen (2003) ﬁnd related to informality,
arguing that higher fractionalization decreases tax compliance because of an
unwillingness to contribute to public goods beneﬁting other ethnic groups.
Concerning the costs of entry, Djankov et al. (2002) provide preliminary
evidence that countries with heavier regulation of entry have larger informal
sectors, in a sample of 85 countries. They argue that their results support
the view of politicians deliberately creating extractable rents by restricting
entry into formal markets. After presenting a model along this line, Auriol
and Warlters (2004) build on this data and argue that informality is best
explained by a combination of level of development, population size, and
cost of entry.
The available evidence on the eﬀe c to ft a x e si sa m b i g u o u s .L o a y z a( 1 9 9 6 )
reports a positive correlation between the level of a country’s highest cor-
porate income tax rate and the size of its informal sector, in a sample of
14 Latin American countries. Johnson et al. (1998) show that countries
with a higher “tax burden”, an index based both on rates and the quality
4See Loayza (1996), Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón
(1998), and Friedman et al. (2000).
5of tax administration and meant to measure how business friendly the tax
system is, have a larger share of unoﬃcial economy. On the other hand, they
show that this is also the case of countries with lower marginal tax rates,
which is not surprising as the lowest rates are found in places like Bolivia
or Uruguay, while the highest one correspond mostly to European OECD
countries. These results are not supported by ﬁrm-level evidence, however,
as Johnson et al. (2000) ﬁnd no eﬀects of taxes on ﬁrms’ hidden sales. Fi-
nally, Friedman et al. (2000) ﬁnd that both higher tax rates and a higher tax
burden index correlate with smaller unoﬃcial activity and conclude that, for
their sample, “the incentive to go underground to dodge higher tax rates is
outweighed by the beneﬁts of remaining oﬃcial when tax rates are higher”.
Labor market rigidities, including minimum wage, ﬁring costs and other
employment laws meant to protect workers, are also potential determinants of
informality. Loayza(1996) shows a positive correlation between labor-market
restrictions and informality. Recently, Botero et al. (2003), ﬁnd that heavier
regulation of labor is associated with a larger unoﬃcial economy in a cross
country sample of 85 countries. However, they are unable to assess causa-
tion as the instrumental regressions using legal origins as instruments are not
signiﬁcant. Evidence based on country level microeconomic data is less con-
clusive, as discussed for example in Heckman and Pages (2003). They ﬁnd
that the impact of the level of job security protection in Latin American on
the formal/informal composition of employment remains ambiguous, despite
some preliminary indications that the decline in employment may be greater
in the covered, formal sector. In a diﬀerent context, Lemieux, Fortin and
Fréchette (1994) use micro data from a randomized survey to analyze the
individual decision to work underground in Quebec City, ﬁnding for exam-
ple signiﬁcant elasticities with respect to wage diﬀerentials, number of hours
worked and taxes for some groups of the population.
Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003), use the cross-country enterprise-
based data of the 1999-2000 World Bank’s World Business Environment Sur-
vey (WBES) to test the constraints facing ﬁrms’ development5. In the section
devoted to the determinants of “unoﬃcialdom” (pages 75 to 83), they present
results on the determinants of ﬁrms’ decision to hide part or the totality of
5On top of detailed information concerning the characteristics of the ﬁrms surveyed,
one question refers particularly to informal activities: “Recognizing the diﬃculties many
enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total
sales would you estimate the typical ﬁrm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”.
The data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/.
6their output. They ﬁrst ﬁnd that more policy instability, higher regulatory
and tax constraints, more corruption and lower protection of property rights
are all signiﬁcantly related to more informality. Moreover, ﬁrms that are
smaller, produce only for the domestic market and are privately and locally
owned are also more likely to be informal6.
To conclude this section and motivate the model, we build on Batra et
al. (2003) and use the WBES dataset to present some additional illustrative
evidence by running simple bivariate probit estimations (see Greene, 1997)
of the joint likelihood that a particular ﬁrm belongs to the category in which
tax compliance is less than 25% and that it lacks access to formal credit
mechanisms. To this end, we build an additional dummy variable capturing
t h ef a c tt h a taﬁrm does not rely on any type of formal ﬁnance and we
complete the ﬁrm-level data with several country-level indicators, including
the cost of entry, rule of law, stability of the environment and labor regulation
(social security laws)7.
Table 1 presents the results. The two upper panels show the results from
the probits, while the lower panel gives the marginal eﬀects of each variable
for the joint probability that a ﬁrm pays less than 25% taxes and does not
have access to any type of formal ﬁnance.
(Table 1 here)
First of all, a Wald test generally rejects the hypothesis that the two equa-
tions are independent, giving some credit to the idea that becoming at least
partially formal and accessing the formal credit market is a joint decision.
Moreover, we again ﬁnd standard results with respect to the regulation of en-
try (represented by the cost in columns 1 to 3 or by the number of procedures
in columns 4 to 6) and the rule of law, which appears to be eﬀective through
its impact on the access to ﬁnancing. A more stable environment appears
to favor formality, while the eﬀect of labor regulations is less clear in this
6In the original survey, answers vary from 1 to 8, corresponding to decreasing percent-
ages of hidden output being reported, from 100% in category 1 to 0-25% in category 8.
This last category is the more interesting from our point of view since ﬁrms declaring
less than 25% of their sales are likely to be real informal units, while those declaring a
higher fraction of their sales would rather be formal ﬁrms evading taxes. Moreover, at the
country level the selection of ﬁrms for the survey is likely to imply under-representation of
informal units, as only ﬁrms with 5 or more employees are included, so Batra et al. results
must rather be seen as a test of the degree of informality or of tax evasion.
7All deﬁnitions and sources are in Appendix.
7context. The most signiﬁcant index is that capturing social security laws,
s h o w ni nc o l u m n s3a n d6 ,a n di t se ﬀect is signiﬁcant through the ﬁnancing
access part of the model. Finally, as ﬁrm level aspects are concerned, smaller
ﬁr m sa p p e a rt ob em o r el i k e l yt or e m a i ni n f o r m a l .
As for marginal eﬀects, being small implies a 3 to 4% increase in the
probability to be informal (which is slightly above 3% for the sample means
of the explanatory variables), one additional registration procedure increases
the probability of being informal by 0.2 to 0.3% (the corresponding ﬁgure is
close to 0.2% for an additional 10% of GDP cost of entry), while an increase
of two points in the rule of law index (i.e. a worsening), from the level of
Portugal to that of Uruguay for example, corresponds to an approximately
2.4% higher probability to be informal. As the volatility of the growth rate is
concerned, going from the level of countries like Germany, Spain, the United
States or Canada, to that of the more volatile countries (Armenia or Georgia),
would imply an increase of 8 to 11% in the probability to be informal.
We now present a simple model that captures the main stylized facts
presented in this section.
3 The Basic Model: Entry Costs vs. Access
to Formal Credit Market
Consider as a starting point the following continuous investment model
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Firms (or individuals) have initial capital A,
which can be cash or some kind of productive assets pledgeable as collat-
eral. Assets in the economy have an initial distribution characterized by a




By accessing the credit market, ﬁrms intend to borrow an amount I −A
and undertake productive projects of variable size I, yielding RI in case of
success and 0 in case of failure. Note that income is assumed to be fully
veriﬁable. Moreover, the probability of success depends on the ﬁrm’s eﬀort,
which is not observable by the lender. Moral hazard is here formalized by
assuming that the ﬁrm can either work, in which case the probability of
success is pH,o rs h i r k ,i nw h i c hc a s ei ti so n l ypL <p H,b u ti te n j o y sa
private beneﬁt BI (or equivalently saves on the cost of eﬀort).
T h ec r e d i tc o n t r a c ti m p l i e sa na g r e e m e n to nal e v e lo fﬁnancing I and a
sharing rule RI = Rb + Rl where Rb and Rl are the shares corresponding to
8the borrower and the lender respectively.
Making the standard assumptions that the net present value (NPV) per
unit of investment is positive if eﬀort is exerted:
pHR>1, (1)
and negative if not:
pLR + B<1, (2)
the problem is solved under the incentive constraint of the borrower:




and the break-even constraint of the lender:
pHRl ≥ I − A. (4)
Equation (3) deﬁnes the maximum pledgeable income Rl = RI − BI
∆p.
A s s u m i n gt h a tt h ec r e d i tm a r k e ti sc o m p e t i t i v e ,s op r o ﬁts are null and (4)
is binding, and substituting, we obtain:








Moreover, the competitive nature of the credit market ensures that borrowers
get all the surplus, so that:
Ub(A)=( pHR − 1)I =( pHR − 1)kA, (7)
making it optimal for them to invest as much as possible8.
Building on this basic model, ﬁrms have the choice between two diﬀerent
operating modes: they can operate as a legally registered ﬁrm or decide to
stay informal.
8Assumptions (1) and (2) on the NPV ensures that k>1. We further assume that
pHR<1+
pHB
∆p , as in the Holmstrom and Tirole setting, so that the optimal size of the
ﬁrm is not inﬁnite.
93.1 Operating Formally
If the ﬁrm decides to operate formally, it must ﬁr s tt a k et h es t e p st or e g i s t e r .
As discussed in the introduction, there are a variety of requirements involved
in formalizing a ﬁrm, which cost is not negligible. We simply formalize these
costs by assuming that the ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed9 “entry cost” C.
As discussed in the introduction, being formal means that the ﬁrm has
accounting data, so its revenue is at least partially veriﬁable, and that it can
engage in legal contractual relationships. This enables it to access the formal
credit market. Straightforwardly, we are in the standard model described
above, with the ﬁrm now disposing of an initial capital A −C.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
the amount invested is given by:
I
F = k(A − C),
where the superscript F denotes “formal”, and the ﬁrm gets utility:
U
F
b (A)=( pHR − 1)k(A − C). (8)
3.2 Operating Informally
On the other hand, the ﬁrm might decide to stay informal, avoiding the
registration expenses C, in which case it lacks the credentials to borrow from
the formal credit market and has to rely on informal lenders. As noted above,
we assume that informal lenders, who are generally not able to verify the
outcome of the borrowers’ projects, ensure repayment of their loans through
the threat of possible violent enforcement techniques.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁnancial markets in developing countries generally holds
that the formal ﬁnancial sector has a comparative advantage in fund inter-
mediation over space and in creating scale economies, as well as the technical
possibility to attach assets as collateral, while the informal credit market en-
joys superiority in solving enforcement and information problems10 (Besley,
9Djankov et al. (2002) report costs for a “standardized” ﬁrm assumed to have a start-
up capital of ten times per capita GDP, so their data do not account for an eventual
variation linked to the initial endowment’s size. Considering an entry cost with both a
ﬁxed and a variable part would not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the results of the model.
10Assuming that informal lenders enjoy both informational and enforcement advantages
leaves however a puzzle as to why they don’t extend their operations to clients of the
formal credit market, and why they charge interest rates that are so much higher than
their formal counterpart.
101995). In a framework of imperfect information and imperfect enforcement
(see for example Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 1993), lending activity entails address-
ing the three following problems: Information acquisition (screening) on the
characteristics of loan applicants, creation of proper incentives to increase the
likelihood that borrowers will be able to repay the loans, adequate enforce-
ment of this repayment to ensure they will be willing to repay. Our moral
hazard framework deals only with the last two issues (incentives and enforce-
ment), but does not address formally the problem of borrowers’ screening.
One way to do so would be to add an adverse selection dimension to the
model, and then examine how costs and incentives to acquire information
diﬀer between formal and informal lenders, as well as the repartition of bor-
rowers in the sense of what type of lender ﬁnances the riskier projects11.
From a more practical point of view, one must consider that there are
many types of informal credit mechanisms. These include informal loans ex-
tended by moneylenders, family members, non-proﬁt organizations, rotating
saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) also known as tontines, etc. The
institutional setting in which they operate varies greatly, depending in par-
ticular of their geographical characteristics, and may range from cases where
there is indeed a nearly free ﬂow of information between lenders and borrow-
ers (see for example Udry, 1993, in the case of rural credit in Northern Nige-
ria), to others in which there is little information gathering and much more
reliance on strong enforcement (see the case of Paraguay mentioned above).
We focus on this last type of credit mechanism, representative for example of
l o a n sm a d eb ym o n e y l e n d e r st os m a l le n t r e p r e n e u r si nu r b a ne n v i r o n m e n t s
characterized by the relative anonymity of contractual relationships.
We thus formalize informal lending by assuming non veriﬁability of in-
come, alongside with the possibility for the lender to impose a loss K on the
borrower in case of non repayment (thus K can be either a pecuniary cost
due to the seizure of assets or, consistently with a limited liability assump-
tion, a non pecuniary one in case of “Maﬁa-style” enforcement)12.M o r e o v e r ,
due to the nature of the cost, the lender only recovers a fraction γK,w h e r e
γ ∈ [0,1].T h e p a r a m e t e r γ has an interpretation close to the transaction
11It is not excluded that such a framework would lead to a situation in which informal
lenders have higher incentives to invest in information acquisition or face overall a less
severe adverse selection problem. However, we leave these extensions for future research.
12The mechanisms C and K can be viewed as alternative versions of an imperfect costly
state veriﬁcation model, with the cost borne by the borrower ex ante and ex post in the
formal and the informal credit markets respectively.
11cost of collusion in the principal-agent literature on regulatory capture and
corruption. It summarizes the fact that this kind of side transactions are
by nature imperfect because they involve in-kind payments, ineﬃcient liqui-
dation of assets (including personal belongings for which the borrower has
speciﬁcb e n e ﬁts from ownership, for example sentimental value), as well as
the need to hide or the fear of being caught. Note also that, although the
cost K is supposed to be a punishment in case of shirking, it is in fact im-
posed also when the project fails because of bad luck (probability 1 − pH)
thus inﬂicting a higher cost to the borrower than solving the moral hazard
problem would require.
Under these assumptions, the constraints of the previous model are mod-
iﬁed in the following way: there are now two incentive constraints for the
borrower, the standard one ensuring eﬀort is exerted and a second one to
induce truthful declaration of income.






pHRb − (1 − pH)K ≥ pHRI − K
⇔ Rb ≥ RI − K. (10)
From (1) and (2), RI > BI
∆p,s ot h a t(10) implies (9) and only (10) will be
binding13, implying Rb = RI −K. The participation constraint of the lender
is then:
pHRl +( 1− pH)γK ≥ I − A. (11)
By substitution, we get:
13This solution dominates the one in which there are no incentive constraints and the
lender imposes the cost K with probability one. In this case he would recoup γK instead
of [pH +( 1− pH)γ]K here. The diﬀerence comes from the fact that when the project
succeeds and truthful declaration of income is induced (probability pH), the lender avoids
the loss γ.W h e nγ =1 , both solutions become equivalent (note that Rl = K for all γ).
12pH(RI − Rb)+( 1− pH)γK ≥ I − A
⇔ pHK +( 1− pH)γK ≥ I − A.
Assuming competition in the informal credit market yields the feasible
level of investment (the superscript I denotes “informal”):
I
I = A + ΦK, (12)
where Φ = pH +( 1− pH)γ,s ot h a tΦ ∈ [pH,1].14
The utility of the borrower is given by:
U
I
b (A)=pHRb − (1 − pH)K − A.
Noting that Rb = RII − K, and substituting from (12), it follows:
U
I
b (A)=( pHR − 1)A +( pHRΦ − 1)K. (13)
Note that depending on the value of γ, the second term on the right
hand side might be positive or negative. Obviously, if it is negative (which
happens for low values of γ), the ﬁrm is better oﬀ renouncing to the loan and
investing with its own funds, in which case it gets a surplus (pHR − 1)A.
Thus, a better enforcement technology for the repayment of informal loans,
in the sense of a higher γ, is to the advantage of both parties.
3.3 Optimal Choice of the Firm
We can now compare the beneﬁts from becoming formal or staying informal
at diﬀerent levels of wealth A. From the expressions of UF
b (A) and UI
b (A),
we can draw ﬁgure 1.
(Figure 1 here)
In Figure 1, we see that, because the ﬁxed cost of formality C shifts
the UF
b (A) line to the right, there is a cutoﬀ level A∗,b e l o ww h i c hs t a y i n g
14Note also that if K>R I , Rb =0and the lender rips oﬀ all the surplus. In this case,
the borrower would not take the loan, because the threat in case of failure is too strong.
13informal dominates. There is forced informality for any A lower than C,a n d
voluntary informality between C and A∗.
T h em o d e li m p l i e st h a tﬁrms holding lower initial assets remain infor-
mal because the combination of costly registration costs and credit rationing
makes the formal credit market unattractive to them. This provides an al-
ternative and complementary mechanism to the one proposed for example
in Rauch (1991) and Choi and Thum (2002), where smaller ﬁrms are less
likely to be audited and penalized for evading taxes, or to see labor market
regulation enforced upon them.
Basic comparative statics show that the prevalence of informality re-
sponds to the relative eﬃciency of credit markets in an intuitive way. A
more eﬃcient formal credit market (in the sense of a higher k) favors formal-
ity, while a more eﬃcient technology in the informal lending market (both in
the sense of a higher enforcement technology K, and lower transaction costs
captured by a higher γ) favors informality.
This eﬃciency diﬀerential can be related to the eﬀective rate of interest
paid by borrowers (denoted by rF
b i nt h ef o r m a lc r e d i tm a r k e ta n drI
b in the










− 1 > 0.
So the model yields the prediction that the interest rate diﬀerential be-
tween informal and formal loans, given by 1
Φ − 1, is inversely related to the
size of the informal sector.
3.4 Collateral
Loans backed by some sort of collateral are the most common formal credit
contracts (see Besley, 1995, and Pagano, 2001), with real estate and ﬁduciary
15In the formal sector, borrowers receive I − (A − C)=( k − 1)(A − C) and pay back
Rl =( R − B
∆p)I =( R − B
∆p)k(A − C) in case of success (pH)a n d0 in case of failure
(1 − pH). Simple computations show that pH(R − B
∆p)k = k − 1,s ot h a t1+rF
b =1 .
In the informal sector, borrowers receive ΦK and pay back K in case of success (pH)




14collateral being the main form used. For example, La Porta, López-de-Silanes
and Zamarripa (2002) for Mexico, and Monje-Naranjo, Cascante and Hall
(2001) for Costa Rica show that 84% and 89% of the banks’ credit portfolio
in their respective studies are backed by collateral. Moreover, such loans
are generally over-collateralized, with guarantees to loan ratios of 2.89 and
between 1.28 and 2.94 respectively16.
In the model presented above, the borrower makes an initial contribution
A to the investment. From the point of view of the lender, this reduces the
agency rent to be left to the borrower in order to preserve his incentive to
exert eﬀort to a level where this rent is less than the monetary payoﬀ of
the project and the lender is able to break even. In this sense, A shares
the incentive characteristics of a collateral, although it is not stricto sensu
equivalent, as it is consumed in the realization of the project. In what follows,
we modify the model to allow for collateral, and show that the basic insights
are preserved.
Consider the case where the asset A is used to support production but
still retains its value after the realization of the project. Moreover, to obtain
a loan, the borrower has to give the lender a contingent right to seize the
asset in case of non-repayment. Redeﬁning the project’s surplus, to be shared
between the parties, as RI +A = Rb+Rl, and considering that the borrower
receives Rb in case of success and 0 if failure, it is easy to see that its incentive
constraint (equation 3) is not modiﬁe d .A sf o rt h eb r e a k - e v e nc o n s t r a i n to f
the lender, it becomes:
pHRl +( 1− pH)A ≥ I − A. (14)




∆p −pHR =2 k. The immediate conclusion is thus that collateral
increases the amount of outside ﬁnancing available to borrowers. Their utility
is then given by:
U
F,C
b (A)=( pHR − 1)kC(A − C)+( A − C).
As for the informal sector, the analysis is unchanged. Asset A appears on
both side of the two borrowers’ incentive constraints, while lenders are not
able to attach the asset as collateral and ensure its eventual judicial recovery
16These ﬁgures are for loans to unrelated parties and to ﬁrms respectively.
15due to the lack of formal documentation. Simple computations show the
amount loaned is unaltered. Therefore, the ﬁnal utility of borrowers is:
U
I,C
b (A)=( pHR − 1)A +( pHRΦ − 1)K + A.
With the possibility of asset collateralization, the shape of Figure 1 re-
mains the same. The line for U
F,C
b (A) still crosses the horizontal axes at C
and, given assumption (1), has a higher slope than that of U
I,C
b (A).W et h u s
obtain that the main comparative statics of the basic model are unchanged,
as would be the extensions considered below.
Finally, several reﬁnements are possible. First, it could be assumed that
only a fraction of asset A is owned in the form of real estate and can be
collateralized, giving rise to a mixed case between the basic results and those
of the present section. Also, a natural assumption would be that the residual
value of the collateral for the lender is lower than A, explaining why losses
are sometimes observed even when collateral appears to cover more than the
value of the loan17. Indeed, assuming that lenders receive only a fraction of
the collateral A, allows to match the stylized facts mentioned at the beginning
of this section that suggest routine over-collateralization, as there would then
exist values of the parameters for which kC − 1 < 1, so the amount lent
I −A =( kC − 1)A c a nb el o w e rt h a nt h ev a l u eo ft h ea v a i l a b l ec o l l a t e r a lA.
3.5 Imperfect Enforcement in the Formal Sector
The eﬃciency of credit markets depends both on the quality of the norms
deﬁning creditor’s rights and on how well these norms are enforced. As doc-
umented for example in Pagano (2001) for several Latin American countries,
formal loans suﬀer from non negligible default rates, and enforcement of the
rules ensuring their recovery is often slow and costly18. In turn, this has a
direct eﬀect on the amounts available for borrowers and on the interest rates
they pay. La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with a poorer quality
of law enforcement have narrower debt markets. Micro-level evidence can be
found in Monje-Naranjo et al. (2001) for Costa Rica, in Castelar Pinheiro
and Cabral (2001) for Brazil, and in Cristini et al. (2001) for Argentina.
17Such a gap in value can be traced back to the cost of enforcing and executing guar-
antees through an ineﬃcient judicial system, as addressed in the next section.
18For Argentina, Cristini, Moya and Powell (2001) report court costs of enforcement
that vary between 4.10 and 8.83% of total claims. For Paraguay, Straub and Sosa [2001]
give estimates of between 9.4 and 25.4%.
16We introduce this idea in the model, modifying the break-even constraint
of the lender in the following way:
θpHRl ≥ I − A, (15)
where θ ∈ [0,1] is an index of the quality of institutions (norms deﬁning
creditor’s rights, legal system, etc.) and of the enforcement of these rules.
As θ decreases, lenders know that on average they will bear a higher cost to
recover their loans. As the incentive constraint of the borrower is unchanged,













so that a better institutional framework and better enforcement make the
formal credit market more eﬃcient in terms of amounts loaned19,a n di m p l y
that formality becomes attractive at lower levels of capital A.
3.6 Taxes
Tax avoidance is often put forward as a motive to escape the formal sector.
The incentive to avoid costly tax payments is reinforced by the fact that,
although informal, ﬁrms are not fully excluded from all public goods and
may free ride. While they may for example be unable to beneﬁtf r o ml e g a l
enforcement of property rights and contracts, they may still beneﬁtf r o m
general infrastructure and security. Furthermore, informal substitutes for
some public goods may be available. Depending on the relative cost and
eﬃciency of formal public goods and their informal substitutes, and on the
19θ aﬀects the lenders’ rate of return, equal now to 1
θpH in order to allow them to
break even despite the cost of enforcement, but leaves the interest rate faced by borrowers
unchanged. This eﬀect on the amounts loaned rather than on the interest rates is consistent
with evidence from the empirical literature on small ﬁrms ﬁn a n c e( s e ef o re x a m p l eP e t e r s e n
and Rajan, 1994, and Straub and Sosa, 2001).
17extent to which free-riding is possible, there may be equilibria, in which some
producers are better oﬀ staying informal.
In our simple framework, a tax τ on beneﬁts may for example aﬀect the
borrower incentive constraint in the following way:




T h el e n d e r ’ sb r e a k - e v e nc o n s t r a i n ti sn o wo ft h ef o r m :
θ(τ)pHRl ≥ I − A, (19)
where θ(τ) indicates the dependence of the judicial enforcement system
on the funds made available through taxation.
Additionally, following the discussion above, consider the possibility that
taxes also ﬁnance general infrastructure that makes production more eﬃcient,
and from which informal producers are only partially excluded. On way to
formalize this is to assume that a level of taxation τ implies a productivity
level R(1+ε(τ)) in the formal sector, and R(1+νε(τ)) in the informal sector,
with ν<1, ε(0) = 0, ετ > 0, εττ < 0.
By substitution, we get that






∆p(1−τ) − θ(τ)pHR(1 + ε(τ))
. (20)


















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the direct eﬀect of taxes, which is
negative (∂kθ,τ
∂τ < 0). The second term is the indirect enforcement enhancing
eﬀect, which goes in the opposite direction if we assume that higher taxation
improves the institutional framework because it makes more funds available
to ﬁnance it20,i . e . dθ
dτ > 0. The third term is the indirect productivity
enhancing eﬀect, which is also positive. Clearly, the eﬀect of the level of
20This might not be true if congestion eﬀects exist. For example, for very high level
of spending, bureaucratic complications may hinder rather than facilitate the judicial
recovery of loans.
18taxes on kθ,τ is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the partial
eﬀects.
Finally, to assess simply the net eﬀe c to ft a x e si nt h i sf r a m e w o r k ,i ts u ﬃces
to rewrite the utility of both types of borrowers:
U
F





b (A)=( pHR(1 + νε(τ)) − 1)A +( pHR(1 + νε(τ))Φ − 1)K.
In addition to the ambiguous eﬀect on kθ,τ, it can also be shown that
the direct productivity enhancing eﬀect of taxes on the relative beneﬁts of
formality and informality through the function ε(τ) c a nb eb o t hp o s i t i v eo r
negative21.
Overall the eﬀect of higher taxes on the relative beneﬁts of formality
is thus ambiguous. It must indeed be noted that tax policy decisions take
into account a variety of objectives, and may or may not be optimal with
respect to their speciﬁc impacts on the ﬁnancial and productive spheres.
This probably explains why the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 2
concerning the eﬀect of taxes on informality is not clear-cut.
3.7 Stability of the Environment
The productive project yields (in per unit terms) R with probability pH and
0 with probability 1 − pH. The variance of output is therefore equal to
(1 − pH)pHR2. Assuming pH ≥ 1
2, this variance is thus decreasing in pH,
so we will consider that higher values of pH correspond to more stable (less
risky) environments22. The question is then to determine how the relative
stability of the economic environment, deﬁn e di nt h i sw a y ,a ﬀects the trade-
oﬀ between formality and informality.
This question can be answered directly by noting that the threshold level
A∗ such that UF
b (A∗)=UI
b (A∗) is given by:
21The proof is omitted. Note that even if the direct eﬀect of ε(τ) were systematically
in favor of formality, the overall eﬀect would still be ambiguous because of the result on
kθ,τ.





, maximum at 1


















A shift toward a more stable economic environment, in which the risk of
failure is lower, makes it more valuable to sink the cost C in order to become
formal. It thus favors formal activities more than informal ones and should
reduce the fraction of ﬁrms operating informally.
To be more rigorous still, and noting that when pH varies, the mean pHR
also changes along with the variance, we need to look at a mean-preserving
spread. This can be obtained by compensating an increase from pH to pH+ε,
with a decrease in the value of the project from R to
RpH
pH+ε . For an unchanged











Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fε, i.e. a bigger increase in the probability of success of
the project, corresponds to a lower variance, at all levels of pH.M o r e o v e r ,
note that k is now given by k = 1
1+(pH+ε)pLB
(pL+ε)∆p −pHR
,s ot h a t∂k
∂ε > 0 holds24.
The rest of the proof is unchanged, and we again conclude that with a mean-
preserving spread, a lower variance implies less informality.
We summarize the main results of previous sections in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 The minimum level of initial assets A* above which the ﬁrm
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sink the entry cost in order to access the formal credit
market is:
- Increasing in the entry cost;
23The terms kC
k−1 and K
k−1 are both decreasing in pH since ∂k
∂pH > 0.A s f o r t h e t e r m
(pHRΦ−1)
(pHR−1) , it can be shown that it is also decreasing in pH for values of γ such that
pHRΦ > 1, i.e. such that informal lending actually takes place.
24We maintain ∆p constant. To ensure comparability, we need to modify also the level
of private beneﬁt, from B to
pLB
(pL+ε), so that in case of shirking the unit expected private
beneﬁt is still pLB.
20- Decreasing in the interest rates diﬀerential between the formal and the
informal credit markets;
- Decreasing in the quality of legal enforcement of creditors’ rights;
- Decreasing in the stability of the environment;
- Ambiguously related to the level of taxation.
4 Labor Market Rigidities
We now enrich the model by explicitly introducing a production function in
the realization of the project. Consider that the output e R(I) is such that:
e R(I)=F [I,L(I)] − wL(I), (24)
where w is the market wage rate and F [I,L(I)] is a function relating
output to the amount of labor L(I) and the amount of capital I employed.
Note that for most small and medium size enterprises, I would consist of
their initial capital A and a fraction I − A of “working capital”, i.e. cash
to acquire the necessary inputs or commodities in the case of commercial
projects. In what follows, we use for simplicity a constant return to scale
Cobb-Douglas functional form such that F [I,L(I)] = IαL(I)1−α.
Consider ﬁrst a competitive labor market, so that the equilibrium wage
wE is equal to the marginal productivity of labor. Firms determine the
amount of labor they are going to hire by maximizing:
max
L
e R(I)=F [I,L(I)] − w
EL(I), (25)







Denoting by L the total labor supply in the economy, in the absence of














wE = L. (26)
25In addition, note that substituting for LF
wE(I) in the Cobb-Douglas production func-












α ,s ot h a tt h e
introduction of this production function is fully compatible with our previous framework.
This follows of course from the functional form used. Although it is not necessary to derive
the following results, it makes the model more tractable.
21Several studies document the existence of a labor market segmentation,
with informal employees earning lower wages than their formal sector coun-
terparts26.T h ec a u s e so fs u c has e g m e n t a t i o nm i g h tb ef o u n di nl a b o rm a r k e t
rigidities, as for example high ﬁring costs and constraining minimum wage
legislations.
To formalize this idea in a simple way, we assume that there exists a
mandatory minimum wage w, which is strictly greater than the market clear-
ing wage wE. More broadly, this higher cost of labor can be related to other
factors, such as high payroll taxes and dismissal costs (see Freije, 2001, and
Heckman and Pages, 2003). By deﬁnition, as in Rauch (1991), this minimum
wage is only enforced in the formal sector.














w = L. (27)
Firms again determine their demand of labor in order to maximize the











As w grows, ﬁrms demand less labor relative to their initial level of capital.







This also has an impact on the informal sector: as LF
w decreases, the supply
of labor in this sector rises, implying a lower equilibrium wage wI in order
to clear the market, and a higher return RI in this sector.
To sum up, a binding wage constraint in the formal sector has two com-
plementary eﬀects. First it shifts the allocation of labor in the economy,
with less employment available in the formal sector (technologies become
more capital intensive) and more informal employees at a lower wage in the
26There is however a debate about the validity of this segmentation hypothesis (see
Freije, 2001, for a summary). A more complete picture should take into account diﬀerences
between informal employees and self-employed, as well as mobility between the formal and
the informal sector.
22informal fringe. Moreover, as it also aﬀects the returns in both sector (neg-
atively in the formal sector, positively in the informal one), the cutoﬀ level
A∗ above which formality dominates actually goes up, which reinforces the
ﬁrst eﬀect by further reducing formal employment opportunities (see Figure
2). This result is summarized in proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Labor market rigidities, in the form of a minimum wage
requirement above the market clearing level, push ﬁrms to remain informal
at higher level of initial capital and reduce employment in the formal sector.
(Figure 2 here)
5C o n c l u s i o n
At the ﬁrm level, costs of being formal include signiﬁcant ﬁxed expenses in
terms of registration fees. As for beneﬁts, they are generally considered as
resulting from enhanced access to public goods. We have argued that key
public goods, such as property rights protection and contract enforcement,
are important not only because they improve ﬁrms’ productivity directly, but
because they secure access to important markets, where they make interac-
t i o n sm o r ee ﬃcient.
The model, in which costly registration facilitates the access to the formal
credit market, provides theoretical predictions about the eﬀect of several
variables (initial assets, eﬃciency of credit markets, rule of law, volatility
of the environment, taxes, labor regulation) on the incidence of informality,
which are consistent with the existing stylized facts.
From a policy point of view, this suggests that one important channel
through which better rule of law and judicial enforcement may reduce infor-
mality is by making market interactions more eﬃcient, therefore rendering
the participation in formal credit markets more attractive. Moreover, by
reducing the need for agents to rely on informal credit mechanisms, it may
have important welfare consequences, since one major drawback of infor-
mal lending is the generalized lack of project screening that probably leads
to a lower average social value of the projects being ﬁnanced. Finally, our
23framework also points out to the potential beneﬁts of micro-credit programs
that make better credit mechanisms available to small entrepreneurs, while
in some sense bypassing some of the costs of formality.
As for potential lines of research, from an empirical viewpoint, it would
be interesting to develop more precise measures of the relative eﬃciency of
formal and informal credit markets in and across countries. From a theoret-
ical point of view, an open question is to examine how formal and informal
lenders’ incentives to acquire information on loan applicants may diﬀer, and
how these select diﬀerent types of credit mechanisms. Finally, in a dynamic
perspective, two questions emerge. The ﬁrst one is to assess the impact of
a dual credit market structure and of the costs of entry into formality on
industries’ dynamics. The second is to determine how the factors considered
here would shape the growth potential of an economy.
246 Appendix: List of Variables and Sources
WBES data.
Informal: Dummy variable taking value 1 if percentage of sales declared
to tax authorities is between 0 and 25%,a n d0 otherwise.
Informal ﬁnance: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a ﬁrm declares not
having received ﬁnancing from any of the following source: local commercial
bank, development bank, foreign bank, leasing, equity issuing, and public
sector, and 0 otherwise.
Small/Medium/Large: Dummy variables corresponding to ﬁrms with 5-
50, 51-500, and more than 500 employees respectively.




LnpcGDP 99: Log of the 1999 per capita GDP in current US dollars.
Source: World Development Indicators.
Cost of entry/number of procedures: Cost, as a share of 1999 per capita
GDP, and number of procedures involved in carrying out the steps a start-up
entrepreneur has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status. Coverage:
85 countries. Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
Growth volatility: variance of the annual GDP growth rate over the pe-
riod 1990-99. Source: Global Development Finance and World Development
Indicators.
Rule of law: Synthetic Index, scaled from 0 (better rule of law) to 10
(worst rule of law). Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999).
Labor regulation: 1997 index on the regulation of labor describing the
legal protection of workers. The speciﬁc index used in the estimations relates
to social security laws. Coverage: 85 countries. Source: Botero et al. (2003)
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N 6564 6564 6564 6564 6564 6564
Log likelihood -6066.13 -5771.33 -5669.74 -5950.98 -5759.75 -5685.81
Wald test of ρ=0: p-value 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.11
Marginal Effects (dy/dx)*



























































































* For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an increase by 1 unit.
y = Pr(inf.=1; inf. finan.=1) is the bivariate predicted probability at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
Dependent Variables are Informal: Dummy Variable indicating whether the Percentage of Sales Declared to Tax Authorities is
below 25% (1) or above (0); Informal financing: Dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm declares having received investment
finance from no formal credit source, and 0 otherwise. Additional firm-level controls not shown in table include dummy variable for
full private ownership and sector dummies (agriculture, construction, services, manufacture). Robust z statistics, corrected for
clustering at the country level, in parenthesis.
a: significant at the 1% level. b: significant at the 5% level. c: significant at the 10% level.
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